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The sizeable increase in house prices combined with an unprecedented
rise in household debt have been among the most important facts observed
in several Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) countries in the last decade. In addition, the two facts are usually
perceived as mutually reinforcing phenomena. The rise in house prices has
induced households to increasingly extract equity from their accumulated
assets, thereby encouraging further borrowing against the realized capital
gains. Dynamics of this sort have been considered important in sustaining
the level of private spending in several countries, especially during the busi-
ness-cycle downturn of 2001. Figure 3.1 displays the dynamics of total
private consumption and household mortgage debt in the United States.
Figure 3.2displays the joint behavior of private consumption and of (a har-
monized index of) house prices. It is clear that these three variables display
a signiﬁcant degree of comovement at the business-cycle frequency.
A large part of the observed increase in household borrowing has been
in the form of collateralized debt. Hence, the role of durable goods—espe-
cially housing—as an instrument of collateralization has also increased
over time. Figure 3.3 displays the evolution of mortgage debt (as a proto-
type form of secured debt) as a share of total outstanding household debt.
This share has increased from about 60 percent in 1952 to about 75 percent
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Debt leverage of all types is often troublesome when one
judges the stability of the economy. Should home prices fall,
we would have reason to be concerned about mortgage debt.1
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1. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan’s remarks at America’s Community
Bankers Annual Convention, Washington, D.C., October 19, 2004.in 2005. If one were to consider also vehicles loans, the share of collateral-
ized debt in the United States would rise to about 90 percent.2
While developments in the housing sector and institutional features in
mortgage markets (e.g., prevalence of ﬁxed versus variable mortgage con-
tracts, importance of equity withdrawal, down payment and reﬁnancing
rates) have become common vocabulary for monetary policymakers
around the world, the same issues have received very scant attention in the
recent normative analysis of monetary policy.
The monetary policy literature has soared in the last few years within the
framework of the so-called New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS). The NNS
builds on microfounded models with imperfect competition and nominal
rigidities and has currently emerged as a workhorse paradigm for the nor-
mative analysis of monetary policy.3 However, in the NNS, the transmis-
sion mechanism of monetary policy remains limited to a typical real inter-
est rate channel on aggregate demand. The latter channel ignores issues
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2. See Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) and Aizcorbe, Kennickell, and Moore (2003).
3. See, among many others, Goodfriend and King (1997), Woodford (2003), Clarida, Galí,
and Gertler (1999), King and Wolman (1999), Khan, King, and Wolman (2003).
Fig. 3.1 Consumption and mortgage debtrelated to credit market imperfections, wealth eﬀects linked to the evolu-
tion of asset prices, households’ heterogeneity in saving rates, and deter-
minants of collateralized debt.
Principles of optimal monetary policy within the NNS revolve around
the polar star of price stability.4 Consider the basic eﬃciency argument for
price stability. Suppose, for the sake of exposition, that the economy expe-
riences a positive productivity shock and that prices are completely rigid.
Firms are constrained to comply with demand at that given price. Hence,
they react by raising markups and reducing labor demand. The stickiness
of prices generates room for a procyclical monetary intervention to boost
aggregate demand in line with the higher desired production. In turn, this
validates the strict stability of prices as an equilibrium choice by ﬁrms. In
practice, this monetary policy intervention manages in eliminating the dis-
tortion induced by price stickiness.
Matters are diﬀerent in our framework, characterized by two main fea-
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4. In fact, much of the existing literature can be interpreted as studying the conditions un-
der which deviating from the price stability paradigm can be consistent with eﬃciency. See
Woodford (2003) for a complete analysis.
Fig. 3.2 Consumption and house pricestures. First, households display heterogenous patience rates and, therefore,
diﬀerent marginal utilities of consumption (saving). Second, the more im-
patient agents face a collateral constraint on nominal borrowing. Both el-
ements constitute a deviation from the standard representative agent
model with free borrowing, which is typical of the NNS. In that frame-
work, by construction, debt is always zero in equilibrium.
To understand why these features may alter the baseline normative im-
plication of price stability that emerges in the NNS, we emphasize two dis-
tinct dimensions: ﬁrst, the role of nominal private debt per se; second, the
role of durable prices in aﬀecting the ability of borrowing by endogenously
altering the value of the assets that act as collateral.
Consider the role of debt ﬁrst. If debt contracts are predetermined in
nominal terms, inﬂation can directly aﬀect household’s net worth by re-
ducing the real value of outstanding debt service. Thus, inﬂation can have
redistributive eﬀects (from savers to borrowers). The key issue, then, is the
extent to which a Ramsey-optimal policy would like to resort to this redis-
tributive margin in equilibrium. Once again, consider a temporary rise in
productivity. A constrained household (the borrower), whose marginal
utility of current consumption exceeds the marginal utility of saving,
would like to increase spending and do so disproportionately more than an
unconstrained agent (the saver), who engages in consumption smoothing.
106 Tommaso Monacelli
Fig. 3.3 Mortgage debt as a share of total outstanding household debtAt the same time, in a model with collateral requirements, the borrower
faces a wealth eﬀect on labor supply. In fact, in order to sustain the surge
in consumption, the borrower needs to optimally balance the purchasing
of new debt with an increase in labor supply required to ﬁnance new col-
lateral. The tighter the borrowing constraint, the more stringent the neces-
sity of increasing labor supply. Importantly, monetary policy can exert an
inﬂuence on this margin. By generating inﬂation, the monetary authority
can positively aﬀect the borrower’s net worth, thereby allowing the con-
strained household to increase consumption for any given level of work
eﬀort.
Thus, the presence of nominal debt per se may constitute a motiva-
tion for deviating from a price stability prescription. In fact, and already
previewing some of our key results, our analysis indicates that the opti-
mal volatility of inﬂation is increasing in two parameters symbolizing het-
erogeneity: (1) the borrower’s weight in the planner’s objective function; 
(2) the borrower’s impatience rate (relative to the saver).
However, and due to the presence of price stickiness, inﬂation variabil-
ity is costly. Hence, monetary policy will have to optimally balance the in-
centive to oﬀset the price stickiness distortion with the one of marginally
aﬀecting borrower’s collateral constraint. Our results point out that, quan-
titatively, the incentive to oﬀset the price stickiness distortion is predomi-
nant and that, already for a small degree of price stickiness, equilibrium de-
viations from price stability are small.5
Next consider the role of durable (asset) prices. In a way similar to the
credit cycle eﬀects exposed in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Iacoviello
(2005), movements in the real price of durables endogenously aﬀect the
borrowing limit and, in turn, consumption. The mechanism is simple. A
rise in the price of durables induces, ceteris paribus, a fall in the marginal
value of borrowing (i.e., a softening of the borrowing constraint). This im-
plies, for the borrower, a fall in the marginal utility of current (nondurable)
consumption relative to the option of shifting consumption intertempo-
rally (in other words, a violation of the Euler equation), which can be vali-
dated only by a rise in current consumption. In turn, the increased demand
for borrowing further stimulates the demand for durables and its relative
price, inducing a cycle eﬀect that further boosts (nondurable) spending.
In an eﬃcient equilibrium with free borrowing and lending, the bor-
rower would indeed like (given his impatience) to expand borrowing to ﬁ-
nance current consumption. Yet he or she would do so withoutresorting to
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5. In this context with incomplete markets (in fact, one-period nominal debt is the only
traded asset), there is an even more fundamental motive for inﬂation volatility, namely the in-
centive of the planner to “complete the markets” by rendering nominal debt state contingent.
This motive, however, is strictly intertwined with the redistributive motive we emphasize here.
In fact, no debt would be traded in the absence of heterogeneity, which in turn is the essential
feature justifying redistribution.an increase in demand for durables. Hence, collateral limits per se induce
ineﬃcient movements in the relative price of durables. On the other hand,
though, a strict stabilization of durable prices is largely detrimental for the
borrower and would be inconsistent with the need of realizing sectoral
relative price movements. As a result, the optimal policy balances the in-
centive to partially stabilize relative durable prices with the one of oﬀ-
setting the stickiness in nondurable prices. In fact, in our simulations, a
Ramsey-type policy emerges as an intermediate case between two extreme
forms of Taylor-type interest rate rules: a rule that strictly stabilizes non-
durable price inﬂation and a rule that strictly stabilizes the relative price of
durables.
The existing literature related to this chapter originates from the seminal
work of Bernanke and Gertler (1989), who emphasize the role of collateral
requirements in aﬀecting aggregate ﬂuctuations. In Bernanke and Gertler
(1989), collateral constraints are motivated by the presence of private in-
formation and limited liability. More recently, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
build a general equilibrium model in which two categories of agents (bor-
rowers and savers) trade private debt. Heterogeneity is introduced in the
form of diﬀerent patience rates. In Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), collateral
requirements are motivated by the presence of limited enforcement, in a
way similar to the approach followed here. Both Bernanke and Gertler
(1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), despite some diﬀerences, share the
central implication that the wealth of the borrower inﬂuences private
spending. Iacoviello (2005) extends the work of Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) to build a bridge with the recent New Keynesian monetary policy
framework. In his analysis, the role of nominal debt and asset prices are
central for the propagation of monetary policy shocks, but no normative
aspect is analyzed. Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) analyze the implica-
tions for macroeconomic volatility of the relaxation of collateral require-
ments in the United States (dated around 1980) in a general equilibrium en-
vironment. However, their real business-cycle framework is not suitable for
a study of monetary policy, and it abstracts from any role of asset prices.
Recently, Erceg and Levin (2006) study optimal monetary policy in an
economy with two sectors (durable and nondurables) and similar to the
one employed here. Their analysis, though, abstracts from any form of
credit market imperfection.
3.2 The Model
The model builds on Iacoviello (2005) and Campbell and Hercowitz
(2005). The economy is composed of two types of households, borrowers
and savers,and two sectors—producing durable and nondurable goods, re-
spectively—each populated by a large number of monopolistic competi-
tive ﬁrms and by a perfectly competitive ﬁnal-goods producer. The bor-
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therefore, a higher propensity to consume.6 Complementary to this as-
sumption is the one that the borrowers face a collateral constraint. In fact,
if agents were free to borrow and lend at the market interest rate, the bor-
rowers would exhibit a tendency to accumulate debt indeﬁnitely, rendering
the steady state of the economy indeterminate. Peculiar to the borrowers is
that their preferences are tilted toward current consumption. Formally,
their marginal utility of current consumption exceeds the marginal utility
of saving. As a result, in the face of a temporary positive shock to income,
they do not act as consumption smoothers but tend instead to reduce sav-
ing. In this vein, the presence of household debt reﬂects equilibrium in-
tertemporal trading between the two types of agents, with the savers acting
as standard consumption-smoothers.7
3.2.1 Final-Good Producers
In each sector (j c,d) a perfectly competitive ﬁnal-good producer pur-
chases Yj,t(i) units of intermediate good i. The ﬁnal-good producer in sec-
tor j operates the production function:






where Yj,t(i) is quantity demanded of the intermediate good i by ﬁnal-good
producer j, and εj is the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated va-
rieties in sector j. Notice, in particular, that in the durable good sector,
Yd,t(i) refers to expenditure in the new durable intermediate good i (rather
than services). Maximization of proﬁts yields demand functions for the
typical intermediate good i in sector j:
(2) Yj,t(i)    
 ε
jYj,t j   c, d
for all i. In particular, Pj,t   [ 
1
0Pj,t(i)1–εjdi]1/(1–εj) is the price index consistent
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6. For early general equilibrium models with heterogenous impatience rates, see Becker
(1980), Woodford (1986), Becker and Foias (1987), Krusell and Smith (1998). More recently,
see Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Iacoviello (2005), and Campbell and Hercowitz (2005). Here
we use the categories borrower/saver as synonimous of impatient and patient household, re-
spectively. Notice, however, that the fact that the relatively more impatient (patient) agent
emerges as a borrower (saver) is an equilibrium phenomenon.
7. Galí, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007) also construct a model in which agents are het-
erogenous along the consumption-smoothing dimension and use it to analyze the eﬀects of
government spending shocks. In their framework, the nonsmoothers are agents that are com-
pletely excluded from the possibility of borrowing (following Campbell and Mankiw [1989],
those agents are named rule-of-thumb consumers). Hence, in that framework, private debt
cannot emerge as an equilibrium phenomenon.





The representative borrower consumes an index of consumption services
of durable and nondurable ﬁnal goods, deﬁned as:
(3) Xt   [(1    )1/ (Ct)(  1)/     1/ (Dt)(  1)/ ] /(  1),
where Ct denotes consumption services of the ﬁnal nondurable good, Dt
denotes services from the stock of the ﬁnal durable good at the end of pe-
riod t,   0 is the share of durable goods in the composite consumption
index, and   0 is the elasticity of substitution between services of non-
durable and durable goods. In the case   → 0, nondurable consumption
and durable services are perfect complements, whereas if   →  , the two
services are perfect substitutes.
The borrower maximizes the following utility program
(4) W0   E0 ∑
 
t 0
 tU (Xt, Nt) 
subject to the sequence of budget constraints (in nominal terms):
(5) P c,tCt   P d,t[Dt   (1    )Dt   1]   Rt 1Bt 1   Bt   W tNt   Tt,
where Bt is end-of-period t nominal debt, and Rt 1 is the nominal lending
rate on loan contracts stipulated at time t – 1. Furthermore, Wt is the nom-
inal wage, Nt is labor supply, and Tt are net government transfers. Labor is
assumed to be perfectly mobile across sectors, implying that the nominal
wage rate is common across sectors.
In real terms (units of nondurable consumption), equation (5) reads:
(6) Ct   qt [Dt   (1    )Dt 1]    bt   Nt  
where qt   P d,t/P c,t is the relative price of the durable good, and bt   Bt/P c,t
is real debt. The left-hand side of equation (6) denotes uses of funds
(durable and nondurable spending plus real debt service), while the right-
hand side denotes available resources (new debt, real labor income, and
transfers). An important feature of equation (6), which follows from debt
contracts being predetermined in nominal terms, is that (nondurable) in-
ﬂation can aﬀect the borrower’s net worth. Hence, for given outstanding
debt, a rise in inﬂation lowers the current real burden of debt repayments.
Later we will work with the following speciﬁcation of the utility function
U (Xt, Nt)   log(Xt)   Nt
1 ϕ,
where ϕ is the inverse elasticity of labor supply and υ is a scale parameter.9
υ
 
1   ϕ
Tt  
P c,t
W t  
P c,t
Rt 1bt 1  
 c,t
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9. Notice that we abstract from an explicit role for money. Along the lines of Woodford
(2003, ch. 2), one can think of the present economy as a cashless limit of a money-in-the-Collateral Constraint
Private borrowing is subject to a limit. We assume that the whole stock
of debt is collateralized. The borrowing limit is tied to the value of the
durable good stock:
(7) Bt   (1    ) DtP d,t,
where   is the fraction of the durable stock value that cannot be used as a
collateral.
In general, one can broadly think of   as the down payment rate, or the
inverse of the loan-to-value ratio, and, therefore, an indirect measure of the
tightness of the borrowing constraint.10 Jappelli and Pagano (1989) pro-
vide evidence on the presence of liquidity constrained agents by linking
their share to more structural features of the credit markets. In particular,
they ﬁnd that the share of liquidity-constrained agents is larger in countries
in which a measure of the loan-to-value ratio is lower.11
Notice that movements in the durable good price directly aﬀect the abil-
ity of borrowing. It is widely believed that the recent rise in house prices in
the United States has induced households to increasingly extract equity
from their accumulated assets, thereby encouraging further borrowing
against their realized capital gains. This link between asset price ﬂuctua-
tions and ability of borrowing has presumably played an important role in
determining households’ spending patterns during the recent business-
cycle evolution.12
We assume that, in a neighborhood of the deterministic steady state,
equation (5) is always satisﬁed with equality.13 We can then rewrite the col-
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utility model, in which the weight of real money balances in utility is negligible. Our main-
tained assumption is that the monetary authority can directly control the short-run nominal
interest rate. This allows us to abstract from any monetary transaction friction driving the op-
timal policy prescription toward the Friedman rule.
10. Notice, though, that   0 does not correspond to a situation in which the borrowing
constraint is absent. That situation would obtain only in the case in which heterogeneity in
patience rates were assumed away. See more on this point in the following.
11. The form of the collateral constraint has been deliberately kept simple to facilitate the
analysis. However, there are at least two important dimensions that are neglected here. First
is incorporating an explicit mortgage reﬁnancing choice. In the United States, in the last few
years, the ability of extract equity has worked primarily through reﬁnancing decisions linked
to the downward trend in nominal interest rates. Second is a distinction between ﬁxed and
variable rate mortgage contracts. For a positive analysis of these issues, see Calza, Monacelli,
and Stracca (2006).
12. For instance, Alan Greenspan’s view is summarized by the following excerpt:
Among the factors contributing to the strength of spending and the decline in saving have
been developments in housing markets and home ﬁnance that have spurred rising house-
hold wealth and allowed greater access to that wealth. The rapid rise in home prices over
the past several years has provided households with considerable capital gains. (House
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Aﬀairs, Federal Reserve’s First Monetary
Policy Report for 2005, 109th Cong., 1st sess., February 16, 2005) 
13. This assumption is obviously not uncontroversial. Ideally, one would like a model in
which the borrowers may be free to choose to hit the borrowing limit only occasionally.lateral constraint in real terms (i.e., in units of nondurable consumption)
as follows:
(8) bt   (1    )qtDt
Given {b–1, D–1}, the borrower chooses {Nt, bt, Dt, Ct} to maximize equa-
tion (4) subject to equations (6) and (8). By deﬁning  t and  tψt as the mul-
tipliers on constraints (6) and (8), respectively, and Ux,tas the marginal util-
ity of a generic variable x, eﬃciency conditions read:
(9)  
(10) Uc,t    t
(11) Uc,tqt   Ud,t    (1 −  )Et{Uc,t 1qt 1}   Uc,t(1    )ψtqt







Equations (9) and (10) are standard. Respectively, they state that the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is equalized
to the real wage (in units of nondurable [ND] consumption) and that the
marginal utility of income is equalized to the marginal utility of consump-
tion. Equation (11) is an intertemporal condition on durable demand. It re-
quires the borrower to equate the marginal utility of current (nondurable)
consumption to the marginal gain of durable services. The latter depends
on three components: (1) the direct utility gain of an additional unit of
durable U d,t; (2) the expected utility stemming from the possibility of ex-
panding future consumption by means of the realized resale value of the
durable purchased in the previous period,  (1 –  )Et{Uc,t   1qt   1}; and 
(3) the marginal utility of relaxing the borrowing constraint Uc,t(1 –  )ψtqt.
Notice that, in the absence of borrowing constraints (i.e., ψt   0), the lat-
ter component drops out. Intuitively, if ψt rises, the borrowing constraint
binds more tightly (i.e., the marginal gain of relaxing the constraint is
larger), and, therefore, the marginal gain of acquiring an additional unit of
durable (which, once used as collateral, allows to expand borrowing) is
higher.
The interpretation of ψt is more transparent from equation (12), which
is a modiﬁed version of an Euler consumption condition. Indeed, it re-
duces to a standard intertemporal condition in the case of ψt   0 for all t.




 Un,t  
Uc,t
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Hence, our assumption remains valid only to the extent that we consider small ﬂuctuations
around the relevant deterministic steady state (see more on this in the following) so that stan-
dard log-linearization techniques may still be applied. This can be assured by specifying dis-
turbance processes of suﬃciently small amplitude.Alternatively, it has the interpretation of an asset price condition. In fact,
the marginal value of additional borrowing (the left-hand side ψt) is tied to
a payoﬀ (right-hand side) that captures the deviation from a standard
Euler equation. Consider, for the sake of argument, ψt rising from zero to
a positive value. This implies, from equation (12), that U c,t    Et{Uc,t 1(Rt/
 c,t   1)}. In other words, the marginal utility of current consumption ex-
ceeds the marginal utility of saving, that is, the marginal gain of shifting
one unit of consumption intertemporally. The higher ψt, the higher the net
marginal beneﬁt of purchasing the durable asset, which allows, by margin-
ally relaxing the borrowing constraint, to purchase additional currentcon-
sumption.
3.2.3 Savers
The economy is composed of a second category of consumers, labeled
savers. They diﬀer from the borrowers in the fact that they have a higher
patience rate. In addition, we assume that the representative saver is the
owner of the monopolistic ﬁrms in each sector. The saver does not supply
labor. Saver’s utility can be written:
(13) E0 ∑
 
t   0
 tU ˜(X ˜
t, D ˜
t) .
Importantly, preferences are such that the saver discounts the future more
heavily than the borrower, hence     . The saver’s sequence of budget
constraints reads (in nominal terms):
(14) P c,tC ˜
t   P d,t[D ˜
t   (1    )D ˜
t 1]   Rt 1B ˜
t 1   B ˜






t is the saver’s nondurable consumption, D ˜
t is the saver’s utility ser-
vices from the stock of durable goods, B ˜
t is end-of-period t nominal debt
(credit), T ˜
t are net government transfers, and   ˜
j,t are nominal proﬁts from
the holding of monopolistic competitive ﬁrms in sector j.
The eﬃciency conditions for this program are a standard Euler equa-
tion:
(15) U ˜








and a durable demand condition (in the absence of borrowing constraints)
(16) qtU ˜
c,t   U ˜
d,t    (1    )Et{U ˜
c,t 1qt 1}.
In this case, being a permanent-income consumer, the saver will equate
the marginal rate of substitution between durable and nondurable con-
sumption exactly to the standard user cost expression prevailing in the ab-
sence of borrowing constraints.
Optimal Monetary Policy with Debt and Borrowing Constraints 1133.2.4 Production and Pricing of Intermediate Goods
A typical intermediate good ﬁrm i in sector j hires labor (supplied by the
borrowers) to operate a linear production function:
(17) Yj,t (i)   Aj,tNj,t(i),
where Aj,tis a productivity shifter common to all ﬁrms in sector j. Each ﬁrm
i has monopolistic power in the production of its own variety and, there-
fore, has leverage in setting the price. In so doing, it faces a quadratic cost
equal to (ϑj/2){[P j,t(i)]/[P j,t–1(i)] – 1}2, where the parameter ϑj measures the 
degree of sectoral nominal price rigidity. The higher ϑj, the more sluggish
is the adjustment of nominal prices in sector j. In the particular case of 
ϑj   0, prices are ﬂexible.
The problem of each monopolistic ﬁrm is to choose the sequence {Nj,t(i),
P j,t(i)} 
t 0 in order to maximize expected discounted nominal proﬁts:
(18) E0 ∑
 
t   0
Λj,t P j,t(i)Yj,t(i)   WtNj,t(i)       1 
2
P j,t  
subject to equations (1) and (17). In equation (18), Λj,t    Et{  ˜
t 1/ t} is the
saver’s stochastic discount factor, and   ˜
t is the saver’s marginal utility of
nominal income. Let’s denote by P j,t(i)/Pj,t the relative price of variety i in
sector j. In a symmetricequilibrium in which P j,t(i)/P j,t 1 for all iand j, and
all ﬁrms employ the same amount of labor in each sector, the ﬁrst order
condition of the preceding problem reads:
(19) [(1   εj)  εjmcj,t]Yj,t   ϑj( j,t   1) j,t
  ϑjEt  ( j,t 1   1) j,t 1  (j   c, d),
where  j,t   P j,t/P j,t – 1 is the gross inﬂation rate in sector j, and
(20) mcj,t  
is the real marginal cost in sector j. Recall that, due to labor being perfectly
mobile, the nominal wage is common across sectors.
Rearranging equation (19), one can obtain the following sector-speciﬁc
price setting constraint, assuming the form of a forward-looking Phillips
curve
(21)  j,t( j,t   1)    Et   j,t 1( j,t 1   1) 
   mcj,t    
εj   1
 
εj
εj Aj,tNj,t  
ϑj
Pj,t 1  
Pj,t




P j,t 1  
P j,t







114 Tommaso Monacellifor j   c, d, and where
  (if j   c)
  (if j   d)
and
(22) mcj,t   (if j   c)
(23) mcj,t   qt
 1 (if j   d).
Equation (21) constraints the evolution of sectoral prices when the price-
setting problem is inherently dynamic as in equation (18). It has the form
of a so-called New Keynesian Phillips curve in that current inﬂation de-
pends on future expected inﬂation and on the deviation of the real mar-
ginal cost from its ﬂexible-price constant value. An equation such as (21) is
a fundamental building block of the recent stream of models of the NNS.14
In the particular case of ﬂexible prices, the real marginal cost must be
constant and equal to the inverse steady-state markup (εj – 1)/εj, for j   c, d.
Notice that, in the durable sector, variations in the relative price of durables
(possibly due to sectoral asymmetric shocks) drive a wedge between the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure on the one
hand and the marginal product of labor on the other. Hence, the real mar-
ginal cost is directly aﬀected by movements in the relative price. This aspect
is important because it points to a typical ineﬃciency that constrains mon-
etary policy in models with two sectors. Namely, in the presence of sectoral
asymmetric disturbances, if prices in either sector are sticky, simultaneous
stabilization of real marginal costs in both sectors becomes unfeasible. In
fact, asymmetric shocks will necessarily require equilibrium movements in
the relative price.
3.2.5 Market Clearing
Equilibrium in the goods market of sector j requires that the production
of the ﬁnal good be allocated to expenditure and to resource costs origi-
nating from the adjustment of prices
(24) Yc,t   Ct   C ˜
t   ( c,t   1)2
(25) Yd,t   Dt   (1    )Dt 1   D ˜
t   (1    )D ˜





 Un,t  
Uc,tAd,t
 Un,t  
Uc,tAc,t
qt 1  
qt
Uc ˜,t 1  
Uc ˜,t
P j,t 1  
P j,t
Λt 1  
Λt
U c ˜,t 1  
Uc ˜,t
P j,t 1  
P j,t
Λt 1  
Λt
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14. See Galí and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003).Equilibrium in the debt and labor market requires, respectively:
(26) Bt   B ˜
t   0
(27) ∑
j
Nj,t   Nt.
3.2.6 Equilibrium
For any speciﬁed policy process {Rt} and exogenous state vector {Ac,t,
Ad,t}, an (imperfectly) competitive allocationis a sequence for {Nt, Nc,t,Nd,t,
bt, Dt, D ˜
t, Ct, C ˜
t,  c,t,  d,t, ψt, qt} satisfying equations (6) and (8) with equal-
ity, and equations (9) to (12), (15), (16), (21), (24), (25), and (27).
3.3 Steady State of the Competitive Equilibrium
In this section, we analyze the features of the deterministic steady state
associated to the competitive equilibrium. We emphasize two results. First,
the borrower is always constrained in the steady state (and, hence, will re-
main such forever). This is assured by the assumption that the borrower is
more impatient than the saver, hence the marginal utility of saving if the
former is lower than the one of the latter. Second, the steady-state level of
debt is unique and positive. It is a general result of models with heteroge-
nous discount rates and borrowing constraints that the patient agent will
end up owning all available assets. This has been pointed out in earlier
work by Becker (1980) and Becker and Foias (1987). In the context of our
framework, this translates into the borrower holding a positive amount of
debt in the steady state.
We proceed as follows. In the steady state, the saver’s discount rate pins
down the real rate of return. Hence, by combining the steady-state version
of equation (15), which implies R    c/ , with equation (12), we obtain
(28) ψ   1    0,
where  c is the steady-state rate of inﬂation in nondurables. Notice that  
  implies ψ 0. In other words, absence of heterogeneity entails that the
borrowing constraint does not bind. That would correspond to the stan-
dard scenario in a representative agent economy.
A corollary of equation (28) is
(29)   RR   ,
where RR is the steady-state real interest rate. Hence, the borrower’s dis-
count rate exceeds the steady-state real interest rate.
In a ﬂexible price steady state for both sectors, taking the ratio of equa-
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Assuming equal price elasticity of demand in both sectors (εd εc), we have
q   1. By evaluating equation (11) in the steady state (and given our pref-
erence speciﬁcation), we obtain the relative consumption of durables by
the borrower:
(31)   [1    (1    )   (1    )ψ]  
Notice that the relative demand for durables is increasing in the shadow
value of borrowing ψ. Intuitively, acquiring more durables allows to mar-
ginally relax the borrowing constraint.
The steady-state leverage ratio, deﬁned as the ratio between steady-state
debt and durable assets owned, can be written:
(32)   (1    )
To pin down the level of debt we proceed as follows. We choose parameter
υ in order to set a given level of hours worked in the steady state15(N   N  ).
By combining (6), (8), (32) we can write:
(33) D  
where  c   εc/(εc – 1) is the (steady-state) markup in the nondurable sector
and
     [1   (1    )   ψ (1    )]       .
Once D is obtained from equation (33), it is straightforward, using equa-
tion (32), to solve for the unique level of the borrower’s debt in the steady
state. This steady-state level of debt would be indeterminate in the special
case in which agents did not exhibit heterogeneity in preference rates (see
Becker 1980).
3.4 Optimal Monetary Policy
Having laid out our framework, we next proceed to study the optimal
conduct of monetary policy. The optimal monetary policy literature in the
context of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models with
(1    )(1    )
  
 















(εd   1)/εd   
(εc   1)/εc
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15. In particular, we will require that the borrower devotes to work one-third of the time
unit.nominal rigidities has soared in the last few years.16 However, these devel-
opments have neglected a number of features that are central to the pres-
ent analysis: (1) the presence of nominal private debt and heterogeneity; (2)
the role of collateral constraints; and (3) the role of durable prices in aﬀect-
ing the ability of borrowing endogenously.
3.4.1 The Ramsey Problem
We assume that ex-ante commitment is feasible. In the classic approach
to the study of optimal policy in dynamic economies (Ramsey 1927; Atkin-
son and Stiglitz 1980; Lucas and Stokey 1983; Chari, Christiano, and
Kehoe 1991) and in a typical public ﬁnance spirit, a Ramsey planner max-
imizes the household’s welfare subject to a resource constraint, to the con-
straints describing the equilibrium in the private-sector economy, via an
explicit consideration of all the distortions that characterize both the long-
run and the cyclical behavior of the economy.
Recently, there has been a resurgence of interest for a Ramsey-type ap-
proach in dynamic general equilibrium models with nominal rigidities.
Khan, King, and Wolman (2003) analyze optimal monetary policy in an
economy where the relevant distortions are imperfect competition, stag-
gered price setting, and monetary transaction frictions. Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2004) and Siu (2004) focus on the joint optimal determination
of monetary and ﬁscal policy. However, the issue of optimal policy in the
face of households’ credit constraints has been largely neglected.
A point of particular concern in deﬁning the planner’s problem in an
economy with heterogeneity is the speciﬁcation of the relevant objective
function. Let’s deﬁne by   the weight assigned to the saver’s utility in the
planner’s objective function. Then we assume that the planner maximizes
the following weighted utility function:
(34) W0   (1    ) ∑
 
t 0






The Ramsey problem under commitment can be described as follows.
Let { k,t} 
t 0 (k   1, 2, ..) represent sequences of Lagrange multipliers on
the constraints (6), (8), (9) to (12), (15), (16), (21), (24), (25), and (27), re-
spectively. For given stochastic processes {Ac,t,Ad,t} 
t 0, plans for the control
variables {Nt, Nc,t, Nd,t, bt, Dt, D ˜
t, Ct, C ˜
t,  c,t,  d,t, ψt, qt, Rt} 
t 0 and for the
costate variables { k,t} 
t 0 represent a ﬁrst-best constrained allocation if
they solve the following maximization problem:
(35) max E0 {W0},
subject to equations (6), (8), (9) to (12), (15), (16), (21), (24), (25), and (27).
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16. To name a few, see Adao, Correia, and Teles (2003), Khan, King, and Wolman (2003),
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005), Woodford (2003), King and Wolman (1999), Clarida, Galí,
and Gertler (1999), Benigno and Woodford (2005).(Non-)Recursivity and Solution Approach
As a result of (some of) the constraints in problem (35) exhibiting future
expectations of control variables, the maximization problem as spelled out
in equation (35) is intrinsically nonrecursive.17As ﬁrst emphasized in Kyd-
land and Prescott (1980) and then developed by Marcet and Marimon
(1999), a formal way to rewrite the same problem in a recursive stationary
form is to enlarge the planner’s state space with additional (pseudo) costate
variables. Such variables bear the crucial meaning of tracking, along the
dynamics, the value to the planner of committing to the preannounced pol-
icy plan. In appendix B and C, we show how to formulate the optimal plan
in an equivalent recursive lagrangian form.
We then proceed in the following way. First, we compute the stationary
allocations that characterize the deterministic steady state of the eﬃciency
conditions of problem (35) for t 0. We label this as deterministic Ramsey
steady state. We then compute a log-linear approximation of the respective
policy functions in the neighborhood of the Ramsey steady state.
The spirit of this exercise deserves some further comments. In concen-
trating on the (log-linear) dynamics in the neighborhood of the Ramsey
steady state, we are in practice implicitly assuming that the economy has
been evolving and policy has been conducted around such a steady state for
a long period of time. Technically speaking, this amounts to assuming that
the initial values of the lagged multipliers involved in problem (35) are set
equal to their initial steady-state values. Khan, King, and Wolman (2003)
apply this strategy to an optimal monetary policy problem in a closed econ-
omy. Under certain conditions, one can show that this approach is equiva-
lent to evaluating policy as invariant from a “timeless perspective,” as de-
scribed in Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2005).
3.4.2 Calibration
In this section, we describe our benchmark parameterization of the
model. This will be useful for the quantitative analysis conducted in the fol-
lowing. We set the saver’s and borrower’s discount factors, respectively, to
  0.99 and   0.98. This implies an annual real interest rate (which is
pinned down by the saver’s degree of time preference) of (1/ )4   1.04.
Throughout, we are going to assume that the Ramsey planner sets the
preference weight   1/2, although we will report sensitivity results on the
value of this parameter.
We wish to work under the assumption that all outstanding debt is col-
lateralized (hence, we ignore the role of unsecured debt, e.g., credit cards)
and that durables are long-lived. Thus, in this context, durables mainly
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17. See Kydland and Prescott (1980). As such, the system does not satisfy per se the prin-
ciple of optimality, according to which the optimal decision at time t is a time invariant func-
tion only of a small set of state variables.capture the role of housing. The depreciation rate for houses is much lower
than the one usually assumed for physical capital and comprises between
1.5 percent and 3 percent per year. Because our model is parameterized on
a quarterly basis, we set   0.025^(1/4).
The annual average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio on home mortgages is
roughly 0.75. This is the average value over the 1952 to 2005 period. This
number has increased over time, as a consequence of ﬁnancial liberaliza-
tion, from about 72 percent at the beginning of the sample to a peak of 78
percent around the year 2000. The same parameter is only slightly higher
when considering mortgages on new houses.18 Hence, we set the LTV ratio
as (1 –  )   0.75, which yields   0.25.
The share of durable consumption in the aggregate spending index, de-
ﬁned by  , is set in such a way that  (D   D ˜), the steady-state share of
durable spending in total spending, is 0.2. This number is consistent with
the combined share of durable consumption and residential investment in
the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) tables. The elasticity
of substitution between varieties in the nondurable sector εc is set equal to
8, which yields a steady state markup of about 15 percent. As a benchmark
case, we set the elasticity of substitution between durable and nondurable
consumption   1, implying a Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation of the con-
sumption aggregator in equation (3).
In order to parameterize the degree of price stickiness in nondurables, we
observe that, by log-linearizing equation (21) around a zero-inﬂation steady
state, we can obtain an elasticity of inﬂation to real marginal cost (normal-
ized by the steady-state level of output)19 that takes the form (εc – 1)/ϑ. 
This allows a direct comparison with empirical studies on the New Keyne-
sian Phillips curve, such as in Galí and Gertler (1999) and Sbordone (2002)
using a Calvo-Yun approach. In those studies, the slope coeﬃcient of the
log-linear Phillips curve can be expressed as (1 – ϑ ˆ)(1 –  ϑ ˆ)/ϑ ˆ, where ϑ ˆ is 
the probability of not resetting the price in any given period in the Calvo-
Yun model. For any given values of εc, which entails a choice on the steady-
state level of the markup, we can thus build a mapping between the 
frequency of price adjustment in the Calvo-Yun model 1/(1 – ϑ ˆ) and the de-
gree of price stickiness ϑ in the Rotemberg setup. Traditionally, the sticky
price literature has been considering a frequency of four quarters as a real-
istic value. Recently, Bils and Klenow (2004) argue that the observed fre-
quency of price adjustment in the United States is higher and in the order
of two quarters. As a benchmark, we parameterize 1/(1 – ϑ ˆ)   4, which im-
plies ϑ ˆ   0.75. Given εc   8, the resulting stickiness parameter satisﬁes 
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18. The source for these numbers is the Federal Housing Finance Board (http://www
.fhfb.gov).
19. To produce a slope coeﬃcient directly comparable to the empirical literature on the
New Keynesian Phillips curve, this elasticity needs to be normalized by the level of output
when the price adjustment cost factor is not explicitly proportional to output, as assumed
here.ϑ Yϑ ˆ (ε– 1)/[(1 – ϑ ˆ)(1 –  ϑ ˆ)] ~ 17.5, where Yis steady-state output. In gen-
eral, however, we will conduct sensitivity experiments on the role of non-
durable price stickiness.
A critical issue concerns the assumed degree of price stickiness in
durables. The comprehensive study by Bils and Klenow (2004) does not re-
port any direct evidence on the degree of stickiness of long-lived durables,
housing in particular. It may appear reasonable to assume that house
prices are in general more ﬂexible than nondurable goods prices. Barsky,
House, and Kimball (2007) argue that sales prices of new houses are ﬂex-
ible. One reason may be that, as the price of new houses can be negotiated,
the role of ﬁxed components such as menu costs can be more easily neu-
tralized. In addition, ﬁgure 3.2 shows that house prices feature a pro-
nounced business-cycle component.
To simplify matters, we will then work under the extreme assumption
that durable prices are ﬂexible. This assumption is not immaterial. Barsky,
House, and Kimball (2007) argue that the assumption of ﬂexible durable
prices dramatically aﬀect the ability of standard sticky price models to re-
produce the empirical eﬀects of monetary policy shocks on durable and
nondurable spending. In particular, if durable prices are ﬂexible, and
against the observed vector autoregression (VAR)-based evidence, durable
spending contracts during expansions. In addition, and regardless of the
assumed degree of stickiness in nondurables, ﬂexible durable prices tend to
impart a form of neutrality to policy shocks to the entire economy. How-
ever, in Monacelli (2005), we argue that the introduction of borrowing con-
straints and the consideration of durables as collateral assets help in rec-
onciling the model with the observed empirical evidence. In this vein,
borrowing constraints act as a substitute of nominal rigidity in durable
prices. In an extreme case, when nondurable prices are also assumed to be
ﬂexible, borrowing constraints can even partially act as a substitute of
nominal rigidity altogether in generating nonneutral eﬀects of monetary
policy.
Table 3.1 summarizes the details of our baseline calibration:
3.5 The Role of Nominal Debt
We begin our analysis by focusing on the role of durable goods and nom-
inal private debt in shaping the optimal policy problem. To that goal, we
ﬁrst analyze the optimal policy problem in a simpliﬁed version of our
model featuring no borrowing constraints. Here we wish to understand
whether the mere introduction of durable consumption can alter the basic
prescription of price stability of the baseline New Keynesian sticky price
model. We conclude that durability per se is not suﬃcient to alter that pre-
scription. We then proceed by introducing household heterogeneity and 
a role for private debt. We show that the presence of nominal debt gener-
ates a redistributive margin for monetary policy that induces the policy
Optimal Monetary Policy with Debt and Borrowing Constraints 121authority to optimally generate deviations from price stability. In equilib-
rium, though, we ﬁnd that those deviations are small.
In both cases, we work with a simpler goods market structure, featuring
only one ﬁnal-good sector. In particular, the competitive ﬁnal-good pro-
ducer assembles intermediate goods purchased from a continuum of mo-
nopolistic competitive producers who run a linear production function as
in equation (17) and set prices optimally, subject to quadratic adjustment
costs. In this simpler economy, the ﬁnal good can be costlessly transformed
into both nondurable and durable consumption. Hence, the relative price
between durable and nondurable goods is always qt   1. As a result, move-
ments in the relative price of durables do not aﬀect the ability of borrow-
ing directly.
The reason for ﬁrst concentrating on this simpler case is twofold. First, it
allows us to study the role of nominal debt per se in shaping the normative
conclusions of a standard New Keynesian model. Second, it allows to ab-
stract from an additional distortion inherent to the two-sector economy
and stemming from ﬂuctuations in the relative price of durables. In fact,
with two sectors, asymmetric sectoral shocks necessarily require, as already
illustrated in the preceding, an adjustment in relative prices that cannot be
brought about eﬃciently if prices are sticky in one or both sectors.20
3.5.1 Benchmark: Price Stability with Durable Goods and 
Free Borrowing
In order to understand the role of durable goods in the monetary policy
problem, we begin by assuming that agents can borrow and lend freely at
the market interest rate. This amounts to assuming away heterogeneity in
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20. See Aoki (2001) and Woodford (2003) for an analysis of optimal monetary policy in the
face of sectoral asymmetric shocks.
Table 3.1 Baseline calibration
Parameter Description Value
β Borrower’s discount rate 0.98
γ Saver’s discount rate 0.99
δ Durable depreciation rate 0.0251/4
χ Inverse LTV ratio 0.25
ω Ramsey preference weight 0.5
ϑd Price stickiness in D sector 0
ϑc Price stickiness in ND sector 17.5
εc Price elasticity of demand in D sector 8
εd Price elasticity of demand in ND sector 8
η Elasticity of substitution between D and ND 1
Notes: LTV = loan-to-value; D = durable goods; ND = nondurable goods.patience rates. To obtain such a benchmark version of our model, it suﬃces
to evaluate the system of ﬁrst-order conditions in equations (9) to (12) in
the particular case of ψt   0. This version of the model corresponds to a
standard representative agent sticky price model simply augmented by the
introduction of durable goods. In appendix A, we describe the structure of
the competitive equilibrium in this case and the corresponding simpliﬁed
form of the optimal policy problem.
Figure 3.4 displays impulse responses to a productivity shock in the
benchmark economy with sticky prices, durable goods, and free borrowing
under the Ramsey equilibrium.
We compare two cases: (1)   1 (full depreciation), which amounts to
assuming away durability; and (2)   0.0251/4, which is the value for the
physical depreciation rate assumed in our baseline parameterization. It is
evident that the benchmark result of price stability under the Ramsey pol-
icy is robust to the introduction of durable goods. With higher productiv-
ity (and income), the household would like to increase both durable and
nondurable spending. Because durables can only be accumulated slowly
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Fig. 3.4 Responses to a productivity shock under the Ramsey equilibrium in the
model with no borrowing constraints: With durability (solid line) and without dura-
bility (  1, dashed line)(recall that the household wishes to smooth the end-of-period stock Dtand
not the ﬂow of durable spending) and because eﬃciency requires the mar-
ginal utility of current consumption to be equated to the expected dis-
counted marginal value of acquiring a new durable, nondurable consump-
tion also moves more gradually, relative to the case   1. Inﬂation,
however, is completely stabilized in both cases. The intuition is simple. The
presence of durables does not introduce per se any additional distortion
that the planner wishes to neutralize. Hence, as it is well understood in the
standard case, the planner induces the economy to behave as if prices were
completely ﬂexible. This is obtained via monetary policy generating an ex-
pansion in demand, which induces ﬁrms to smooth markup ﬂuctuations
completely, thereby validating unchanged prices (zero inﬂation) as an equi-
librium outcome.21
3.5.2 Optimal Inﬂation Volatility with Nominal Debt
Next we wish to consider the role of nominal private debt. In this version
of the model, we reintroduce two critical features: (1) heterogeneity (in pa-
tience rates); (2) a collateral constraint (on the impatient household). Still,
we continue to work within the one-ﬁnal-good sector model (whose details
are reported in appendix B). In this context, we wish to understand
whether the possibility of using inﬂation to aﬀect borrower’s net worth,
and, therefore, to marginally redistribute wealth from the saver to the bor-
rower, may induce the planner to deviate from a strict price stability policy.
Figure 3.5 illustrates how the introduction of borrowing constraints
aﬀects the equilibrium dynamics. Once again, we show impulse responses
to a rise in productivity. We compare two alternative cases, corresponding
to two values of parameter   (solid line for low   and dashed line for high
 ). A higher value of   implies a lower LTV ratio and, therefore, a reduced
ability to collateralize the purchase of durables (hence, broadly speaking,
a tighter borrowing constraint). Unlike a standard permanent-income
consumer, the borrower has preferences tilted toward current consump-
tion. Hence, in the face of higher productivity (income), the borrower
wishes to increase current consumption (reduce saving) and do so to a
larger extent than the saver. In equilibrium, the two agents ﬁnd it optimal
to trade debt, with the saver ending up lending resources to the borrower,
thereby ﬁnancing the surge in consumption of the latter.
Notice that the presence of a collateral requirement (whose strength is
indexed by  ) induces a wealth eﬀect on the borrower’s labor supply. In or-
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21. The implication of durability in response to productivity shocks are relevant for another
dimension, namely the equilibrium response of employment. One can show that whereas em-
ployment tends typically to fall in sticky price models in response to a rise in productivity (as
a result of a downward shift in labor demand; see Galí 1999), the introduction of durables re-
verses the sign of that response (see Monacelli [2006] on this particular point). This is also ev-
ident in ﬁgure 3.4.der to expand consumption, the borrower needs to optimally balance the
purchasing of new debt with an increase in labor supply necessary to ﬁ-
nance new collateral. The tighter the borrowing constraint (i.e., the higher
 ), the more stringent the necessity of increasing labor supply. This debt-
labor supply margin is indeed a general feature of models with collateral re-
quirements.22
In principle, because debt is predetermined in nominal terms, monetary
policy can aﬀect borrower’s net worth by altering the real value of the out-
standing debt service. Hence, it is interesting to understand whether move-
ments in inﬂation are part of the Ramsey equilibrium. In ﬁgure 3.6, we
show impulse responses of inﬂation to the same productivity shock. We re-
port paths for inﬂation under alternative values of  , the weight attributed
to the saver’s utility in the Ramsey optimization problem. It is clear that the
introduction of nominal debt alters the conclusions of the benchmark
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22. For instance, Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) emphasize this channel as a vehicle for
business-cycle expansions/contractions. In their analysis, the reduction in equity require-
ments brought about by the ﬁnancial reforms of the early eighties is a candidate theory of the
so-called great moderation (Stock and Watson 2002).
Fig. 3.5 Productivity shock under the Ramsey equilibrium: Model with borrowing
constraint (low versus high loan-to-value ratio 1 –  )model in that it constitutes a motivation for deviating from a price stabil-
ity prescription.
3.5.3 Heterogeneity
Notice that the amplitude of the inﬂation movements is decreasing in the
saver’s weight  . Intuitively, the larger the Ramsey weight on saver’s utility,
the smaller the inﬂation redistributive motive and, supposedly, the smaller
the variability in inﬂation. This conjecture is conﬁrmed in ﬁgure 3.7, which
plots the volatility of inﬂation as a function of  . Under the Ramsey equi-
librium, larger values of   correspond to a smaller volatility of inﬂation.
Analyzing the eﬀects of alternative values of   is one way to address the
role of heterogeneity. Another way is to look at the eﬀect on inﬂation vari-
ability of diﬀerent values of the borrower’s patience rate  . For values of  
approaching  , we should observe a vanishing of the role of heterogeneous
patience rates, which is key in driving the consumption-saving preferences
of the two agents over the business cycle. Figure 3.8 plots optimal inﬂation
volatility as a function of  .
The support of   is limited to the right by  , which corresponds to the
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Fig. 3.6 Optimal response of inﬂation to a productivity shock: Eﬀect of varying
saver’s weight   in planner’s objectivesaver’s patience rate. Thus, we see that inﬂation variability falls for larger
values of  . In particular, as the borrower’s patience rate converges to the
one of the saver, inﬂation volatility approaches the benchmark value of
zero. In other words, when heterogeneity in patience rates vanishes, the
borrowing constraint ceases to be binding (in, and in the vicinity of, the
steady state), and the Ramsey equilibrium tends to mimic the optimal dy-
namics of a representative agent economy with price stickiness represented
in the previous section. In that environment, we have already shown that
reproducing the ﬂexible price allocation corresponds to the constrained
optimum.
3.5.4 Price Rigidity
It is important to emphasize that movements in inﬂation in the Ramsey
equilibrium are overall very small. Due to the presence of price stickiness,
in fact, inﬂation is costly. Hence, monetary policy has to optimally balance
the incentive to oﬀset the price stickiness distortion with the one of mar-
ginally relaxing borrower’s collateral constraint via the redistributive eﬀect
of inﬂation. To explore how this trade-oﬀ is resolved, in ﬁgure 3.9 we plot
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Fig. 3.7 Optimal inﬂation volatility: Eﬀect of varying saver’s weight   in planner’s
objective functionthe volatility of inﬂation in the Ramsey equilibrium against the degree of
nominal price stickiness ϑ. The extreme case of ϑ approaching zero corre-
sponds to full price ﬂexibility. Hence, we see that changes in the price stick-
iness parameter have a dramatic eﬀect on the equilibrium volatility of in-
ﬂation. In the case of ﬂexible prices, inﬂation volatility (on an annualized
basis) is around 2.5 percent. Yet already for small values of ϑ, the volatil-
ity of inﬂation drops signiﬁcantly and remains barely positive.
This result points to a general feature shared with a large array of equi-
librium business-cycle models recently employed for optimal monetary
policy analysis: namely, the important quantitative role played by the price
stickiness distortion in driving the optimal monetary policy prescription
toward stable inﬂation. One may notice the resemblance of this result (de-
spite the very diﬀerent environment) with the one of Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2004) and Siu (2004), who analyze a joint problem of optimal mon-
etary and ﬁscal policy. In that case, and in the presence of nominal nonstate
contingent government debt, the planner balances the incentive to gener-
ate inﬂation variability, in order to reduce the ﬁnance cost of debt, with the
cost of price variability due to price stickiness. Like here, optimal mone-
tary policy points to resolving the trade-oﬀin favor of minimizing the price
stickiness distortion.
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Fig. 3.8 Optimal inﬂation volatility: Eﬀect of varying patience rate  3.6 Durable Prices and Collateral
So far we have worked with a specialized version of our model featuring
only one ﬁnal-good sector. In so doing, we have neglected any role for en-
dogenous ﬂuctuations in the relative price of durables in directly aﬀecting
the ability of borrowing. Our normative analysis has so far highlighted the
role of two distortions. On the one hand, the planner tries to minimize the
cost of price variability due to the presence of price adjustment costs. At
the same time, with nominal debt, the presence of a collateral requirement
induces the planner to resort to inﬂation variability in order to marginally
aﬀect the borrowing constraint. However, the speciﬁcation of a two-sector
model introduces further distortions. With sectoral asymmetric shocks,
the equilibrium dynamics require an adjustment in the relative price of
durables. In the presence of price frictions or borrowing constraints, these
relative price movements may be brought about in a way nonconsistent
with eﬃciency. We investigate this point in the following.
3.6.1 Ineﬃcient Movements in Relative Prices
Let us deﬁne the natural relative price of durables as the relative price
prevailing with full price ﬂexibility andfree borrowing. In addition, we can
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Fig. 3.9 Optimal inﬂation volatility: Eﬀect of varying price stickiness ϑ ϑdeﬁne the relative price gap as the deviation of the relative price from that
natural benchmark.
Figure 3.10 illustrates how the introduction of price stickiness or bor-
rowing constraints alters the equilibrium dynamics. We plot-selected vari-
ables in response to a rise in productivity in the nondurable sector for three
alternative cases: (1) the solid lines report responses in the naturalcase, that
is, an economy with fully ﬂexible prices and free borrowing; (2) the dashed
lines display the equilibrium in the presence of collateral requirements only
(therefore, with full price ﬂexibility in both sectors); and (3) the dotted lines
display the dynamics when the two-sector model with borrowing con-
straints is augmented with price stickiness in nondurables.
Consider the behavior in the natural case, which constitutes our bench-
mark. In the absence of borrowing frictions and with price ﬂexibility in
both sectors, the rise in productivity in nondurables is completely absorbed
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Fig. 3.10 Responses to a productivity shock in the two-sector model: (1) Natural
versus (2) borrowing constraints with ﬂexible nondurable prices versus (3) borrowing
constraints with sticky nondurable prices
Note: In these simulations, monetary policy is described by a simple Taylor rule Rt   1.5 c, t.via a rise in the relative price of durables and an expenditure switching
toward nondurables. Consistently, equilibrium demand for durables is un-
changed, and a rise in consumption is observed only in the nondurable
sector.
Matters are diﬀerent when a borrowing constraint is added (although
still under the assumption of full price ﬂexibility in both sectors). In this
case (dashed line), the demand for durables must rise due to the need of ﬁ-
nancing further borrowing, with this expansion in durable demand being
ampliﬁed for larger values of the inverse loan-to-value parameter  . Im-
portantly, in an eﬃcient equilibrium with free borrowing and lending, the
borrower would indeed like (given his impatience) to expand borrowing to
ﬁnance current consumption, but in that case there would be no need to re-
sort to an increase in demand for durables. Hence, we observe that the rel-
ative price of durables rises above its natural level in the presence of collat-
eral constraints, with this eﬀect being driven by a collateral motive on
durable demand.
Figure 3.10 also illustrates that the adding of stickiness in nondurable
prices introduces a further source of deviation from the natural relative
price. With sticky nondurable prices, the demand for debt rises more and
so does the demand for durables, inducing a larger increase in the relative
price gap. Overall, the results indicate that both frictions contribute to gen-
erate ineﬃcient movements in the relative price qt from its natural level.
3.6.2 Collateral Eﬀects
In the two-sector model, movements in the relative price of durables are
important, for they exert an endogenous eﬀect on the ability of borrowing.
In this section, we highlight the importance of the transmission channel
linking durable (asset) price variations to consumption. We deﬁne as col-
lateral eﬀect the acceleration on borrowing and consumption that derives
from the price of durables directly aﬀecting the right-hand side of equation
(8). The intuition is akin to the “credit-cycle” phenomenon emphasized in
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005). The mechanism is
simple. The rise in productivity in the nondurable sector boosts the relative
price of durables and, therefore, the value of the asset that can be used as a
collateral (the term qtDt in equation ([8]). The resulting increase in bor-
rower’s net worth rises the demand for borrowing, which is necessary to ﬁ-
nance a surge in consumption. In turn, the higher demand for collateral
boosts durable prices even further, feeding back on the value of available
collateral in a self-sustained cycle.
To illustrate this eﬀect on borrowing and consumption, we compare re-
sponses to a productivity shock (in the nondurable sector) in two cases:
with and without collateral eﬀect. The absence of a collateral eﬀect is ob-
tained by specifying the borrowing constraint in the slightly modiﬁed form:
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ξ,
where ξ∈[0, 1]. We can broadly deﬁne ξas a parameter measuring the abil-
ity of the constrained household to convert a rise in his net worth in ability
of borrowing. The case with full collateral eﬀect corresponds to ξ   1,
while the case without collateral eﬀect corresponds to ξ small and close to
zero. Figure 3.11 suggests that movements in durable prices are crucial for
the ampliﬁcation of the joint dynamics of borrowing and consumption.
With a collateral eﬀect at work, the rise in durable consumption and debt
is much larger relative to the case in which the collateral eﬀect is artiﬁcially
shut down.
Importantly, the collateral eﬀect produces also an acceleration in bor-
rower’s nondurable consumption. The intuition works as follows. The rise
in the real price of durables, via its direct eﬀect on the collateral value, in-
duces a fall in the marginal value of borrowing (ψt in our model). In other
words, the rise in asset prices boosts the ability of borrowing and induces a
marginal relaxation of the borrowing constraint. This implies, for the bor-
rower, a fall in the marginal utility of current (nondurable) consumption
relative to the option of shifting consumption intertemporally (in other
words, a violation of the Euler equation; see equation [12]), which can be
validated only by a rise in current consumption. In turn, the increased de-
mand for borrowing further boosts durable demand and in turn the real
price of durables, inducing a circle that positively feedbacks on nondurable
consumption.
3.6.3 Durable Prices: Ramsey versus Taylor
In this section, we investigate the behavior of the relative price of
durables in the Ramsey equilibrium. To that goal, we proceed by solving
the more general version of the Ramsey problem, as outlined in equation
(35). In particular, we wish to understand whether dampening the volatil-
ity of durable (asset) prices should be of any concern for monetary policy
in this context. It is important to recall, as suggested in the preceding, that
there are two reasons for why the relative price of durables ﬂuctuates in de-
viation from its natural benchmark: (1) the presence of a collateral re-
quirement; (2) price stickiness in the nondurable sector.
To this goal, we compare the dynamics in the Ramsey equilibrium with
a simple generalized Taylor type rule of the following form:
(37)    
    
 q
     1,  q   0,
where R,  c, qcorrespond, respectively, to the steady-state values of Rt,  c,t,
qt. A rule such as equation (37) encompasses several alternative policy
regimes, including the extreme cases of (1) strict nondurable inﬂation tar-
qt  
q




132 Tommaso Monacelligeting (   →  , henceforth ND-targeting); and (2) strict durable price tar-
geting ( q →  , henceforth q-targeting).
In ﬁgure 3.12, we compare the eﬀects of a productivity rise in the non-
durable sector under the Ramsey equilibrium with both the extreme cases
of ND targeting and q-targeting. One central ﬁnding is immediately worth
noticing: the amplitude of the response of the relative price of durables in
the Ramsey equilibrium is intermediate between the extreme cases of ND
targeting and q-targeting. In general, this feature of the Ramsey allocation
is common to the equilibrium behavior of the entire set of variables dis-
played.
Consider a strict q-targeting rule ﬁrst, and compare it with the outcome
under the Ramsey equilibrium. Evidently, this type of policy rule is largely
detrimental for the borrower. Not only it does induce a shut-oﬀ of the col-
lateral eﬀect on borrowing outlined in the preceding, but it also hinders the
necessary relative sectoral adjustment, thereby generating a sizeable drop
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Fig. 3.11 Durable prices and the role of collateral eﬀect on borrowing (responses
to a productivity shock in ND sector)
Note: In these simulations, monetary policy is described by a simple Taylor rule Rt   1.5 c, t.in the demand for collateral and borrowing, and, therefore, in turn, for
nondurable consumption by the borrower. At the same time, because debt
falls in equilibrium, this reduces the consumption-smoothing possibilities
by the saver, whose consumption volatility is in fact ampliﬁed relative to the
Ramsey-optimal allocation.
Consider next a ND-targeting rule. In that case, the eﬀect is somewhat
symmetric. Relative to a Ramsey equilibrium, strict stabilization of non-
durable inﬂation induces an acceleration in the relative price of durables
and in turn an ampliﬁed rise in borrowing and durable demand. This, in
turn, is also reﬂected in an ampliﬁed surge in consumption by the borrower.
Interestingly, the Ramsey-optimal policy emerges as an intermediate
case between the two extreme targeting cases outlined in the preceding.23
In fact, the planner wishes to optimally balance two margins. On the one
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23. Notice that the behavior of the relative price of durables qt is exactly symmetric in the
case of a productivity shock in the durable sector. In that case (not displayed here), qt tends to
fall under ND-targeting, while it falls less in the Ramsey equilibrium.
Fig. 3.12 Ramsey versus Strict ND-targeting versus strict q-targeting: Responses
to a productivity shock in ND sectorhand is the incentive to partially stabilize ineﬃcient movements in the rel-
ative price of durables due to the presence of a collateral constraint. On the
other hand, the planner also has the objective to stabilize nondurable in-
ﬂation due to the presence of a sticky price distortion in that sector. Hence,
a monetary policy that aimed at strictly targeting nondurable inﬂation
would lead to an excess volatility in real durable prices and to an excess
volatility in the borrower’s consumption and debt.
3.7 Conclusions
We have laid out a framework for the analysis of optimal monetary in the
presence of nominal private debt and of a collateral constraint on borrow-
ing. The emergence of a borrowing-lending decision in the equilibrium of
our economy requires heterogeneity between a patient and an impatient
agent. At the margin, and relative to a standard representative agent econ-
omy with price stickiness, optimal policy in this context requires a partial
use of inﬂation volatility with a redistributive motive. However, the fact
that, due to the presence of price stickiness, inﬂation movements are costly
heavily biases the optimal policy prescription toward low inﬂation volatil-
ity. When durable prices have the additional eﬀect of altering the value of
the collateral and in turn the ability of borrowing, optimal policy has a mo-
tive for partially stabilizing the relative price of durables. This is due to the
fact that the model incorporates a motive for durable goods demand (and,
therefore, a pressure on prices) that is strictly linked to the presence of an
ineﬃcient collateral requirement.
There are several other features that have remained unexplored in the
current context and that would deserve a more thorough normative analy-
sis. First, detailed institutional characteristics of mortgage markets should
be more adequately incorporated, for instance, the presence of an equity
withdrawal margin, the possibility of resorting to mortgage reﬁnancing, as
well as the decision of opting for a ﬂexible versus ﬁxed rate mortgage struc-
ture. Second, the analysis should contemplate the possibility that borrow-
ing constraints may be only occasionally binding, and that, in the presence
of uncertainty, the borrower’s decisions may be driven by a precautionary
saving motive. Third, one may wish to extend this framework to the pres-
ence of collateral requirements on other forms of spending, such as busi-
ness investment. Fourth, one may think of extending the present context to
comprise the interaction between monetary and ﬁscal policy. The analysis
of the latter, in particular, may fruitfully take advantage of the implications
of the assumed heterogeneity and of the presence of a collateral constraint,
in order to emphasize, in particular, transmission channels of ﬁscal policy
alternative to the typical ones embedded in the standard neoclassical
growth model.
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Competitive Equilibrium with Durable Goods 
and Free Borrowing
The (symmetric) equilibrium in the one-sector economy with free bor-
rowing, durable goods, and sticky prices can be described (in compact
form) by the following set of equations:
Eﬃciency condition on nondurable and durable consumption:







1   
Standard Euler equation:








(40) ( t   1) t    Et  ( t 1   1)  t 1 
  AtNt     
Resource constraint:
(41) AtNt   Ct   Dt   (1    )Dt 1   ( t   1)2,
where  t is Consumer Price Index (CPI) (ﬁnal-goods) inﬂation. For any
policy sequence {Rt} 
t 0 and stochastic process {At} 
t 0, an (imperfectly)
competitive equilibrium in the one-sector economy with sticky prices and
durable consumption is a sequence {Nt, Dt, Ct,  t} 
t 0, solving equations
(38) to (41). A Ramsey equilibrium in this economy can be obtained 
by maximizing E0 {∑ 
t 0  tU(Ct, Dt, Nt)}, subject to equations (38), (40) 
and (41).
Appendix B
One (Final-Good) Sector Economy
Here we brieﬂy describe the competitive equilibrium in the one-sector
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(42) U c,t   U d,t    (1    )Et{U c,t 1}   U c,t(1    )ψt
Deviation from Euler equation:








(44) ( t   1) t    Et  ( t 1   1) t 1 
  AtNt      
Resource constraint:
(45) AtNt   Ct   Dt   (1    )Dt 1   ( t   1)2
Borrower’s ﬂow budget constraint (with Tt   0):
(46) Ct   qt[Dt   (1    )D t 1]    bt   Nt
Saver’s eﬃciency conditions:
(47) U ˜









c,t   U ˜
d,t    (1    )Et{U ˜
c,t   1}
For any policy sequence {Rt} 
t 0 and stochastic process {At} 
t 0, an (im-
perfectly) competitive equilibrium in the one-sector economy with sticky
prices and borrowing constraints in a sequence {Nt, bt, Dt, D ˜
t, Ct, C ˜
t,  t},
solving equations (42) to (48).
Recursive Ramsey Problem in the One-Sector Economy
Let’s deﬁne by        1–  the discount factor relevant from the view-
point of the Ramsey planner problem, where   is the weight attached on
the saver’s utility. In the following, we describe the form of the optimal pol-
icy program in recursive form. This is necessary because the original prob-
lem is not time-invariant due to the fact that some constraints (such as
equation [21]) exhibit future expectations of control variables. The recur-
sive lagrangian problem in the economy with one ﬁnal-good sector can be
written as follows:
 Un,t  
AtUc,t














c,t 1  
U ˜
c,t
Uc,t 1  
Uc,t
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t 0 [(1    ) tU(Ct, Dt, Nt)      tU(C ˜
t, D ˜
t)]
   t 1,t({Uc,t[1   (1    )ψt]}   Ud,t)    t 1 1,t 1 (1    )Uc,t
   t 2,t (ψt   1)      t 2,t 1
   t 3,t        t 1 3,t 1
   t 4,t  AtNt Ct C ˜
t Dt D ˜
t  ( t 1)2    t 1 4,t 1(1    )(Dt D ˜
t) 
   t 5,t[bt   (1    )Dt]
   t 6,t Ct   Dt    bt   Nt     t 6,t 1 (1    )Dt    
   t 7,t(U ˜
c,t   U ˜
d,t)      t 1 7,t 1(1    )U ˜
c,t
  ( t 8,t      t 1 8,t 1)[U ˜
c,t( t   1) t]    t 8,t      −1  ,
where   ε/(ε– 1) is the steady state markup, and  tis ﬁnal good inﬂation.
This maximization program is recursive saddle-point stationary in the am-
pliﬁed state space {At, Zt}, where Zt   { 1,t–1,  2,t–1,  3,t–1,  7,t–1,  8,t–1}. The
corresponding (log-linearized) set of ﬁrst-order conditions describe a 
time-invariant system of diﬀerence equations to the extent that the initial
condition Z0   Z     [   1,,    2,,    3,,    7,,    8,] is added, where    j denotes the
steady-state value of multiplier  j, for j   1, 2, 3, 7, 8.
Appendix C
Recursive Ramsey Problem in the Two-Sector Economy
The recursive lagrangian for the Ramsey problem in the two sector
economy can be written
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t   0 [(1    ) tU(Ct, Dt, Nt)      tU(C ˜
t)]
   t 1,t({qtUc,t[1   (1    )ψt]}   Ud,t)    t 1 1,t 1 (1    )qtUc,t
   t 2,t (ψt   1)      t 2,t 1
   t 3,t        t 1  3,t 1
   t 4,t[Ac,tNc,t   Ct   C ˜
t   ( c,t   1)2]
   t 5,t[bt   (1    )Dtqt]
   t 6,t  Ct qtDt   bt  Nt    t 6,t 1  (1    )Dtqt 1    
   t 7,t(qtU ˜
c,t   U ˜
d,t)    t 1 7,t 1[  (1    )U ˜
c,tqt]
  ( t 8,t      t 1 8,t 1)[U ˜
c,t( c,t   1) c,t]    t 8,t      c
 1 
  ( t 9,t    t 1 9,t 1)[qtU ˜
c,t( d,t 1) d,t]   t 9,t      d
 1 
   t 10,t Ad,tNd,t   Dt   D ˜
t   ( d,t   1)2     t 1 10,t 1(1    )(Dt   D ˜
t)
   t 11,t(Nt   Nc,t   Nd,t)
   t 12,t      t 1 12,t 1q–1
t 1 
This maximization program is recursive saddle-point stationary in the
ampliﬁed state space {Ac, t, Ad, t, Z  t}, where Z  t   { 1, t–1,  2, t–1,  3, t–1,  7, t–1,
 8, t–1,  9, t–1} and with the initial condition Z 
0   Z   .
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Comment Hanno Lustig
Introduction
Inﬂation has signiﬁcant distributional eﬀects when households issue
and invest in nominal securities. In recent work, Doepke and Schneider
(2007) carefully document large distributional eﬀects from the rise in in-
ﬂation in the United States in the seventies. The surge in inﬂation trans-
ferred real resources from the old to the young, who borrow in nominal
terms, mainly to ﬁnance the house purchase. There may be some welfare
beneﬁts from this type of redistribution if these borrowers are ﬁnancially
constrained. In the context of an overlapping generations model, Doepke
and Schneider (2007) argue that the large inﬂation episodes in the seventies
improved the welfare of the average U.S. household. These distributional
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Angeles, and a faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research.eﬀects are at the heart of Monacelli’s chapter. Monacelli wants an answer
to the following normative question: how does a benevolent planner who
is in charge of monetary policy trade oﬀ the potential redistribution bene-
ﬁts of inﬂation against the costs?
Model Ingredients
There are three key ingredients of the model: (1) household heterogene-
ity in time discount rates, (2) sticky prices, and (3) nominal noncontingent
debt backed by housing collateral. Monacelli’s Ramsey planner trades oﬀ
the beneﬁts of surprise inﬂation on the household side of the economy
against the costs on the producer side.
Environment
The model builds on recent work by Iacoviello (2005) and Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997). The model has two types of households, borrowers and
savers. The borrowers are more impatient, and they run into binding bor-
rowing constraints. These households issue nominal one-period, risk-free
debt that is collateralized by their equity in their house. On the producer
side, ﬁrms incur an adjustment cost when changing the nominal price of a
commodity. Monacelli’s work ﬁts in the Ramsey tradition. By setting mon-
etary policy, the planner in fact chooses the optimal equilibrium prices and
allocations to maximize the weighted utilities of the borrower and the
saver, subject to the constraints imposed by the environment. On the
household side, the planner faces two types of frictions. These frictions im-
pede the planner in equalizing the intertemporal marginal rate of substitu-
tion of these two diﬀerent types of households.
The ﬁrst friction is the market incompleteness. Agents only trade nomi-
nal one-period, risk-free debt. This implies that, when the planner chooses
consumption streams, he has to make sure that the “nominal” present dis-
counted value of these consumption streams less the labor income streams
is measurable with respect to (w.r.t) the history of shocks at t – 1 at each
node, simply because the market structure does not allow for any state con-
tingency in the nominal value of net ﬁnancial wealth. The planner faces
what Aiyagari et al. (2002) refer to as measurability constraints.
The second friction is the borrowing constraint.The planner has to make
sure that the “nominal” present discounted value of these consumption
streams less the labor income streams satisﬁes the borrowing constraint at
each node.
Of course, the planner can use unanticipated inﬂation to create some
state contingency in the real value of the household’s liabilities, thus par-
tially completing the market. But the Ramsey planner needs to trade oﬀ
these beneﬁts from surprise inﬂation against the costs. On the production
side, ﬁrms incur adjustment costs when changing the nominal prices. This
142 Tommaso Monacelliis the third friction in the model: nominal prices are sticky. Hence, surprise
inﬂation distorts the ﬁrm’s production decisions.
Inﬂation: Not a Bad Thing after All?
The Ramsey planner chooses a monetary policy that gets the economy
as close as possible to the ﬁrst-best, given these constraints and costs.
Completing the Market with Inﬂation
In the absence of sticky price frictions, the planner would simply create
enough inﬂation volatility—and, hence, state contingency in the real value
of the borrower’s outstanding liabilities—to equalize the intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution (IMRS) of both households in each state of
the world. In this case, the measurability constraint does not bind. How-
ever, once we add sticky prices to the picture, the incentives of the planner
change.
Sticky Prices
In Monacelli’s model, all of the state contingency in real returns comes
from unexpected inﬂation because the nominal debt has a maturity of just
one period. Hence, the only way to change its real value by 10 percent is
through surprise inﬂation of 10 percent. And, perhaps not surprisingly, the
planner decides not to use this channel very much at all when prices are
sticky. But let us consider the case in which the borrower issues n-period
debt. Well, in this case, the planner could commit to spreading out the in-
crease in inﬂation and the short rate over the next n periods, instead of
bunching all of it in this period. This reduces the size of the distortion of
allocations. Instead of creating 10 percent inﬂation today, the government
could raise the price level by a bit more than 10 percent, but spread out over
a longer period—shorter than the maturity of the debt. This strategy de-
livers the same percent drop in the real value of outstanding debt. The
quantitative conclusion of Monacelli’s chapter might be quite diﬀerent if
there were was nominal debt of longer maturities available to households.
The average maturity of outstanding mortgages for U.S. households is
probably well in excess of ten years because most new contracts have a
thirty-year maturity. So this seems like an important issue.
Fiscal Policy
Similar issues arise in the ﬁscal policy debate. Governments issue mostly
nominal non-contingent debt, and, hence, they have to resort to inﬂation
to create some optimal state contingency in the returns. For example, in
case of a bad ﬁscal shock, the government would like to lower the real value
of outstanding debt to avoid large increases in marginal tax rates (Lucas
and Stokey 1983). However, if the government cannot issue real, contin-
Optimal Monetary Policy with Debt and Borrowing Constraints 143gent securities but instead only issues nominal debt, it could create inﬂa-
tion instead (to complete the market). Siu (2004) studies optimal monetary
and ﬁscal policy in an environment where the government only issues one-
period nominal debt, and he ﬁnds the costs of inﬂation outweigh the bene-
ﬁts, just like Monacelli. The government sticks to the Friedman rule. How-
ever, Lustig, Sleet, and Yeltekin (2006) show that this conclusion changes
when the government can issue nominal debt of longer maturities. They
show it is optimal for the government to issue nominal debt of longer ma-
turities because this allows the government to spread out the costs of dis-
tortions associated with inﬂation over the maturity of the debt. The gov-
ernment willingly pays the risk premium on longer bonds because of its
superior hedging properties.
Suggestions for Future Work
As pointed out by the author as well, it seems of key importance to have
agents in the model trade securities that look more like mortgage contracts.
Real-world mortgage contracts come with ﬁxed rates (FRM) or ﬂoating
rates (ARM). Of course, this inﬂation channel is much less eﬀective when
a large fraction of households have adjustable rate mortgages. The fraction
of ﬁxed rate mortgages varies substantially over time. In fact, it varied be-
tween 30 percent and 80 percent over the last twenty years (Campbell
2006). This variation would have ﬁrst-order eﬀects on how much leverage
monetary policy has in redistributing wealth by creating inﬂation. The
slope of the yield curve is a key determinant of the ﬁxed-ﬂoating ratio in
the United States.1 When the slope of the yield curve increases and this
causes more households to chooses ARMs, the Fed actually loses much of
its ability to redistribute wealth across households.
Interestingly, Campbell (2006) argues that households seem to act as if
long-term interest rates are strongly mean-reverting because they tend to
lock in the low interest rates by choosing an FRM when interest rates are
low. Perhaps households choose the FRMs because they provide some
hedging. When interest rates are low to begin with, households may think
the monetary authorities are more likely to bail them out by creating inﬂa-
tion when a bad aggregate shock hits the economy.
Conclusion
Monetary policymakers have a powerful redistribution tool at their dis-
posal. Inﬂation redistributes wealth from those who hold nominal debt to
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1. Hemert, Kojien, and Nieuwerburgh (2006) argue that a lot of the variation can be at-
tributed to variation in the inﬂation risk premium. In most of the models used for analyzing
normative questions on monetary policy, risk premiums are small and constant. In the data,
there is plenty of evidence of large and time-varying risk premiums in bond markets.those who have issued it. This chapter begins to provide some answers in a
stylized model to the question of whether this motive would cause a benev-
olent planner to deviate from the Friedman rule in a signiﬁcant way. The
provisional answer is no, but more work is needed to obtain precise, quan-
titative answers.
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Discussion Summary
Tommaso Monacelli emphasized that the assumption of noncontingent
debt was both realistic and a general feature of the literature. Making debt
state contingent was an obvious policy implication, but would be hard to
implement.
Richard H. Clarida said that steady states in models with heterogeneous
agents and borrowing constraints were complicated and asked whether it
was obvious that there was such a steady state in this model. Monacelli
replied that in fact it was the existence of the binding borrowing constraint
that ensured a unique steady state.
As a matter of practical relevance, Clarida commented on the increasing
importance of securitized debt as opposed to bank lending and drew at-
tention to how the two forms of credit intermediation have diﬀering impli-
cations for the ﬁnancial system’s response to stress.
Marvin Goodfriend said that he liked the way the chapter combined
macroeconomics and ﬁnance. The only way to decide which frictions were
important was to put them all in the same model and to have a horse race.
Optimal Monetary Policy with Debt and Borrowing Constraints 145In this case, it appeared that the goal of stabilizing prices was most im-
portant.
Andrew Levin suggested that life-cycle considerations could be a signiﬁ-
cant source of heterogeneity; for example, older households might choose
to consume their housing wealth in a model with overlapping generations.
In a similar vein to Goodfriend’s comment about the blend of macroeco-
nomics and ﬁnance, Levin also pointed to the beneﬁt of integrating politi-
cal economy issues into the analysis. For example, in the late 1800s, some
farmers favored a higher rate of inﬂation as a means of diminishing the real
value of their debts.
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